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A recent spike in pricing of prescription drugs has sparked public concern.1
The price of medication has been rising steadily in recent years, including a
few high-profile examples of drastic price increases.2 As a result, the U.S.
spent $450 billion on prescription drugs in 2016, an increase of 5.8 percent
from 2015.3 Maryland residents spent upwards of six billion dollars on
prescription drugs in 2016.4
The continued rising cost of prescription drugs is an issue that hits home
for many Americans, with forty nine percent nationwide reporting they took a
prescription drug within the last thirty days.5 Prices of popular drugs like
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1
Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus
Existing Product Inflation In The Rising Costs of Drugs, HEALTH AFFAIRS 76(January,
2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/files/hlthaff.2018.05147.pdf.
2
Aaron S. Kesslheim, MD, JD, MPH, Jerry Avron, MD, Ameet Sarptwari, JD,
PhD, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and
Prospects for Reform, JAMA (last visited April 19, 2019), https://phhpbahealthscience-new.sites.medinfo.ufl.edu/files/2016/09/jsc1600151.pdf; See
generally Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 18, 2017 5:20 PM), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-priceraises-protests.html.
3
Bill Berkrot, U.S. Prescription Drug Spending as High as $610 Billion by 2021,
REUTERS (May 4, 2017 12:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usadrugspending-quintilesims/u-s-prescription-drug-spending-as-high-as-610-billionby-2021-report-idUSKBN1800BU
4
Total Sales for Prescription Drugs Filled at Pharmacies: Maryland, KISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION (last visited April 19, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/stateindicator/total-sales-for-retail-rxdrugs/?currentTimeframe=0&selectedRows=%7B%22states%22:%7B%22maryland
%22:%7B%7D%7D%7D&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22so
rt%22:%22asc%22%7Dstates%22:%7B%7D%7D%7D&sortModel=%7B%22colId
%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
5
Katie Beyer, Drug Money Part 2: A Look at 2017 State Legislative Efforts to Reduce
Prescription Drug Prices, THE SOURCE BLOG ON HEALTH CARE (Aug. 3, 2017),
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insulin tripled between 2002 and 2013.6 Similarly, the price for an EpiPen has
risen 500 percent since 2007.7
In 2017, Maryland joined forty-three other states’ that have enacted
legislation aimed at combating high drug prices by introducing House Bill 631
(“HB631”).8 In an attempt to address the concern in the rising costs of
prescription drugs, Maryland enacted the Essential Off-Patent or Generic Drug
Price Gouging Prohibition Act (“MD Price-Gouging Act”), which prohibits
price gouging of “essential off-patent or generic drugs.”9 In the bill, price
gouging is defined as “any unconscionable increase in the price of a generic
prescription drug sold in Maryland that is not justified by the cost of
production or expansion of access and results in no meaningful choice for
customers to purchase the drug.”10 The law specifically attempted to target
manufacturers who have historically hiked the prices of generic drugs with no
market competition.11 Companies manufacturing new drugs would not be
included, nor would a majority of generic drug manufacturers who have
participated in competitive markets to help drive their prices down.12
This comment will address the issue of rising prescription drugs costs, and
explore Maryland’s recent attempt at combating high drug prices. Part II will
analyze the M.D. Price-Gouging Act and how it attempted to combat the issue
of rising off-patent drug prices. Part III explains how the high cost of
prescription drugs is affecting Maryland consumers, as well as the recent
litigation over the Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential off-Patent
or Generic Drugs (herin after “the Maryland Price Gouging Act”). Finally, Part
IV will first discuss potential federal solutions, and then it will advocate for
amending the MD Price-Gouging Act to compel companies to notify the state
of impending price increases.

http://sourceonhealthcare.org/drug-money-part-2-a-look-at-2017-state-legislativeefforts-to-reduce-prescription-drug-prices/#_ftn5.
6
Robert Love, Why Drugs Cost So Much, AARP Bulletin (May 1, 2017),
https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2017/rx-prescription-drugpricing.html.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803 (LexisNexis 2017).
10
Id. at § 2-801 (f).
11
Id.
12
Jeremy A. Green, MD, PhD & William V. Padula, PhD, Targeting Unconscionable
Prescription-Drug Prices – Maryland’s Anti-Price-Gouging Law, NEW ENGLAND
JOURNAL
OF
MEDICINE
(October
14,
2017
3:20
PM)
https://catalyst.nejm.org/marylands-anti-price-gouging-law/.
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The Maryland Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”) was implemented in
1973 to provide a private cause of action for consumers harmed by unfair and
deceptive trade practices.13 To this day, the MCPA is the only current
protection for Maryland residents regarding prescription drug prices. The
stated intent of the MCPA is to “provide minimum standards for the protection
of consumers in the State.”14 Mainly, the MCPA protects against unfair or
deceptive trade practices such as “any false, falsely disparaging, or misleading
oral or written statement, visual depiction, or other representation of any kind,
which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading
consumers.”15
Unfortunately, the MCPA falls short of protecting Maryland consumers
from skyrocketing prescription drug prices. A 2010 audit of the MCPA by the
Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”) discovered
that the Act did not ensure that pricing information of drugs was reasonable.16
While the DHMH audit did acknowledge that drug prices are comprised of
various components, they discovered that Pennsylvania’s Medicaid Program
contracted three different vendors to assess the reasonableness of drug
prices.17 Furthermore, the audit found that the company used by the MCPA to
obtain pricing data recently settled a lawsuit, and was involved in litigation
with several entities that allege it colluded with a drug manufacturer to inflate
drug prices.18
The DHMH ultimately recommended that the MCPA identify measures to
ensure pricing data is evaluated and compared to other prices for
reasonableness.19 The reasonableness comparison was added in an attempt to
make the law more enforceable against price increases; however, it still did
not do enough. Maryland’s recent attempt at legislation attempted to combat
this issue head on, though it fell short of this goal.

13

See generally MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 13-301 (LexisNexis 2017).
MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW § 13-103 (a) (LexisNexis 2017).
15
Id. at § 13-301.
16
See generally MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE MEDICAL CARE ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION AUDIT REPORT 9 (December, 2010).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
14
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Senate Panel Investigates Four Pharmaceutical Companies

In 2011, Maryland Congressman Elijah Cummings led an effort to release
congressional reports on pharmaceutical pricing.20 In direct response to
several independent reports, Congressmen Cummings spearheaded an
investigation into drug speculation practices of five companies alleged to be
raising prices of drugs in critically short supply.21 These reports were
precursors to the more recent reports focused on off-patent drug pricing.
The first report, entitled “Sudden Price Spikes in Off-Patent Prescription
Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and
the U.S. Health Care System,” was issued by the U.S. Senate’s bipartisan
Special Committee on Aging.22 The report was the product of a Senate
investigation of “abrupt and dramatic price increases in prescription drugs
whose patents had expired long ago.”23
The committee evaluated four companies: Turing Pharmaceuticals;
Retrophin, Inc.; Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc.; and Rodelis
Therapeutics. All recently purchased decades-old off-patent drugs, and raised
the prices suddenly.24 The report describes a business model in which
companies produce a drug serving a small market as the only manufacturer to
ensure the drug is the best on the market for the condition it treats.25 This
controls access to the drug and allows the companies to engage in “price
gouging” by increasing prices as high as possible.26 The report further
provided illustrations such as Retrophin’s increase of Thiola, a kidney

20

Cummings Investigates Potential Prescription Drug Price Gouging, HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM (March 6, 2018),
https://democrats-oversight.house.gov/cummings-investigates-potential-prescriptiondrug-price-gouging.
21
Id.; See also Coleen Cherici, Patrick McGinnis, Wayne Russell, Buyer beware: Drug
shortages and the gray market, PREMIER HEALTHCARE ALLIANCE (last visited April
18, 2019), http://www.anco-online.org/GrayMarketAnalysis-Premier.pdf; ISMP
Survey on Drug Shortage “Gray Market” Shows Widespread Impact on Hospitals,
(Aug.
25,
2011),
INSTITUTE FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES
https://forms.ismp.org/pressroom/PR20110825.pdf.
22
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG., SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL THAT HARMS PATIENTS,
TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Comm. Print 2016).
23
Id. at 3.
24
Id. (mentioning that Retrophin has appeared to reverse this business model after Mr.
Shkreli).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 4.



8QLYHUVLW\RI%DOWLPRUH/DZ)RUXP

>9RO

medicine, from $1.50 to $30.00 per pill, and Rodelis’s price increase of 30
capsules of Seromycin, a tuberculosis medication, from $500 to $10,800.27
The second report was issued by the Government Accountability Office
and studied a group of 1,441 established generic drugs.28 The study found that
between 2010 and 2015, manufacturers had imposed at least one
“extraordinary price increase” for over 300 of those drugs.29 Additionally, of
those drugs, forty-eight had increases of 500 percent or higher, and fifteen had
increases of 1000 percent or higher.30
C.

Essential Generic Drug Price-Gouging Prohibition

In response to these reports, HB631 was introduced in early 2017, passing
both houses of the Maryland General Assembly by large bipartisan majorities.
The Governor of Maryland, Larry Hogan, declined to sign the bill, citing
constitutional issues.31
The MD Price Gouging Act has two primary functions. First, it prohibits
manufacturers or wholesale distributors from engaging in price gouging in the
sale of an “essential off-patent or generic drug.”32 Under the act, an essential
off-patent or generic drug is any prescription drug free from “exclusive
marketing rights under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, that appears
on the World Health Organization’s model list of essential medicines or is
designated by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene as an essential
medicine.”33 The act additionally requires generic drugs be actively marketed
in the United States by three or fewer manufacturers and be available for sale
in Maryland.34
“Price gouging” is an unconscionable increase in the price of a prescription
drug.35 “Unconscionable Increase” refers to an increase in the price of a
prescription drug that is:

27

Id. at 4-6.
Generic Drugs Under Medicare, Comp. Gen., 1, 14 (2016).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Letter from Gov. Larry Hogan, Governor of Md., to Hon. Michael E. Busch, Md.
Speaker of the House (May 26, 2016) (stating the bill could have dormant commerce
and 14th Am. due process issues.).
32
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-802 (LexisNexis 2017) (repealed 2018).
33
Id. at § 2-801.
34
Id.
35
Id.
28
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(1) excessive and not justified by the cost of producing the
drug or the cost of appropriate expansion of access to the drug
and (2) results in consumers having no meaningful choice of
whether or not to purchase the drug at a higher price due to
the importance of the drug to their health and lack of market
competition.36
A wholesale distributor may increase the price of an essential generic drug
if the price increase is directly attributable to additional costs for the drug
imposed on the wholesale distributor.37
The second primary function of the act is to authorize the Maryland
Medical Assistance Program (“MMAP”) to notify the Attorney General
(“AG”) of any price increase.38 First, MAAP allows the AG to be notified
when the price increase (by itself or in combination with other price increases)
would result in an increase of fifty percent or more in the wholesale acquisition
cost of the drug within the preceding one-year period, or the price paid by
Medicaid for the drug within the preceding one year period.39 Additionally,
MMAP may notify the AG of the price increase in one of three situations.
First, if a thirty-day supply of the maximum recommended dosage, according
to the label for the drug approved under FDCA, would cost over $80 at the
drugs wholesale acquisition cost.40 Second, The AG may also be notified if a
full course of treatment of the drug approved under FDCA, would cost more
than $80 at the drugs wholesale acquisition cost.41 Finally, if the drug is made
available to consumers only in quantities that do not include a thirty-day
supply, a full course of treatment, or a single dose, and it would cost more than
$80 at the drug’s wholesale acquisition cost to obtain a 30-day supply or a full
course treatment.42
The advantages of Maryland’s The MD Price Gouging Act showed a stark
contrast to those of the MCPA. Advocates celebrated the increased discretion
for the Maryland Attorney General to sue companies for unwarranted price
hikes.43 Additional advantages include the AG’s ability to reverse price hikes,
impose fines on the companies said to violate to law and return some funds to

36

Id.
Id. at § 2-802.
38
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-803 (LexisNexis 2017).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Diane Archer, Maryland law protects people from prescription drug price gouging,
JUST CARE (June 14, 2017), http://justcareusa.org/maryland-law-protects-peoplefrom-prescription-drug-price-gouging/.
37
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consumers taking the drugs who have been victims of the price hikes.44 Some
critics viewed the AG’s new powers as roll back of his previous abilities,
because it limits the power to act only for non-competitive drugs and stipulates
that companies must be given time to correct the price hike.45 Regardless,
these new provisions could have allowed for meaningful punishments for drug
companies who unnecessarily hike their prices, and also provide some
monetary relief for patients who suffer from these price hikes.
On the other hand, many opponents to the law have leaned on the idea that
the law simply was not definitive enough to allow manufacturers to know
when they have violated the law. In their reply brief, the Association for
Affordable Medicines (“AAM”) notes that appellee’s have not once given a
straight answer as to whether even a ten percent increase would be
“unconscionable”.46 This disadvantages companies affected by the law
because it decreases the incentive for competition in the market, which only
drives prices higher, creating the ability for more companies to violate the
law.47
,,,

,668(352%/(0

A.

Challenges to the Prohibition Against Price Gouging for Essential
Off-Patent or Generic Drugs

Maryland’s groundbreaking law came with some major pushback.48
Shortly after its passage in July of 2017, the AAM filed a complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to bar the enactment of the law.49 In response,
the Attorney General for Maryland moved to dismiss the claim.50

44

Id.
Green & Padula, supra note 12.
46
Reply Brief for Appellant at 19, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664
(D. Md. 2017)(No. 17-2166), 2017 WL 6402860, at *19.
47
Green & Padula, supra note 12.
48
See generally Erin Cox, Drug Firms Challenge Maryland’s price-gouging law, THE
BALTIMORE
SUN
(December
27,
2017)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-price-gouging-suit20170706-story.html; Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860 (D. Md.
September 29, 2017).
49
See generally Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md.
Jul. 6, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-1860), 2017 WL 2884401.
50
See generally Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. 171860-MJG (D. Md. 2017), 2017 WL 9438490.
45
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The initial hurdle arose when the bill first came across Governor Larry
Hogan’s desk.51 The Governor believed the bill did not do enough to protect
all drug pricing, while at the same time citing the same constitutional issues
found in plaintiff’s complaint.52 According to Governor Hogan, the legislation
did nothing to address the rising cost of patented products and “medical
devices which may be associated with drug delivery.”53 He argued that the
bill should do more for patented drugs, since they make up a significant portion
of the market.54 Ultimately, he refused to sign it, but allowed it to become law
after expressing his concerns.55
Plaintiff’s complaint raised two primary causes of action.56 AAM first
alleged HB 631 is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because the
State of Maryland is discriminating against interstate commerce.57 The
primary purpose of the Commerce Clause is to regulate “commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States;” however, it also prohibits
states from discriminating against interstate commerce.58
The long established “dormant command” in the Commerce Clause
prohibits each state from regulating extraterritorial economic activity.59 The
Supreme Court has long viewed the Commerce Clause as “an implicit restraint
on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute.”60 The
primary factor used in determining if a statute violates the commerce clause
“is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond
the boundaries of the State.”61
Ultimately, AAM alleged HB 631 violates two well established precedents.
First, a state law which regulates commercial activity occurring completely
outside of the State’s borders exceeds the limits of State’s authority and will
generally not succeed “whether or not the regulated commerce has effects

51

Letter from Gov. Larry Hogan, supra note 31.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See generally Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md.
Jul. 6, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-1860), 2017 WL 2884401.
57
Id.
58
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
59
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 6.; Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175, 179 (1995).
60
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 338 (2007); See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power
… [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”).
61
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
52
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within the State.”62 Similarly, AAM further argued that a State may not
attempt to control the price of a good within its borders by regulating the price
of transactions that occur outside of the State.63
AAM stated that HB 631 violates the Commerce Clause because it attempts
to directly regulate prices for transactions, which sometimes largely occur
outside of the state.64 The bill is not limited to commerce that occurs within
Maryland, or even sales that occur between an entity outside of Maryland and
an entity within it.65 Instead, it prohibits generic drug manufacturers and
wholesale distributors from “unconscionably” raising the price of any of their
essential generic drug that is available for sale in the State, even if the
manufacturer or wholesale distributor never directly dealt with a consumer
residing in the State.66
AAM particularly takes issue with the extra territorial reach of HB 631.
Manufacturers sell the majority of off patent and generic prescription drugs to
either large wholesalers or large retail pharmacy chains that warehouse their
own drugs.67 However, of the three largest wholesalers in the country, which
account for ninety percent of the national wholesale market, none reside in
Maryland.68 Only one of the nation’s twenty largest generic drug
manufactures is headquartered in Maryland, and none of them actually
manufacture drugs in the state.69 AAM’s argues that a large portion of offpatent and generic prescription drugs are only made available for sale in the
State of Maryland under specific circumstances.70
In AAM’s view, HB 631 represented an overreach by the Maryland State
legislature which is forbidden by the Dormant Commerce Clause.71
Manufacturers and wholesalers can violate the terms of the law even if they
engage in no direct commercial activity in Maryland at all, because they don’t
sell directly to Maryland consumers.72 This discourages companies from

62

Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
See generally Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“[A] State
may not adopt legislation that has the practical effect of establishing ‘a scale of prices
for use in other states.’”).
64
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9.
65
Id.
66
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9; § 2-801(b)(1)(iv); § 2-803(g).
67
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 9.
68
Id. at 10; RxCommercial Research International, Inc., Investing into BioPharma
Products in the USA (Color): A Reference Guide 156 (2012).
69
Id.
70
Id. (Explain process for how to sell drugs in MD #52 Complaint.).
71
Id.
72
Id.
63
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conducting commerce outside of Maryland due to the potential liability they
will face in the state, even for sales that occur outside of the state.73 AAM’s
motion argued that the law has the practical effect of establishing “a scale of
prices for use in other states,” and should be void.74
AAM next contended that HB 631 should be held void for vagueness in
accordance with the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.75 The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”76 Laws that fail to inform a person of
“ordinary intelligence” exactly what is prohibited violate this requirement of
due process, and are void for vagueness.77 The Supreme Court has
consistently held, “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning . . . violates the first essential of due process of law.78 Vague
laws can have the effect of trapping innocent consumers by not providing fair
warning.79 This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the
protections provided by the Due Process Clause.80
AAM also alleged that HB 631 fails to provide a meaningful description of
what its terms proscribe.81 Civil statutes will normally be deemed
unconstitutionally vague only if the terms are “so vague and indefinite as really
to be no rule or standard at all.”82 This standard requires that an economic
legislation be invalidated if it does not at least establish minimal guidelines to
govern officials or give reasonable notice of the conduct prohibited.83 HB
631’s language prohibited price gouging, which it defines as “increase[ing]
the price of a prescription drug” in a manner that is excessive and not costjustified, leaving consumers with no meaningful choice about whether to

73

Id.; Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56,
70 (D.D.C. 2005).
74
Id.
75
See generally Id.
76
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
77
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
78
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); See also FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A fundamental principle in
our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice
of conduct that is forbidden or required.”)
79
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
80
See generally Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (citing International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284 (1914); Collins v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638, 34 S. Ct. 924, 58 L. Ed. 1510 (1914)).
81
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11.
82
Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602, 614 (2d Cir. 1996).
83
Schleifer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998).
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purchase the drug at an excessive price.84 However, the bill provided no
further guidance as to how to interpret or apply the provisions. The law
provided no way for manufacturers and wholesale distributors to determine
whether a price is “excessive”, whether a price increase is “appropriate”, or
whether a particular consumers options for medicine are “meaningful”.
Furthermore, AAM took issue with the broad powers given to the AG when
deciding whether or not to launch an investigation or lawsuit.85 The definitions
of the terms justified, appropriate, excessive, and meaningful are left entirely
to the discretion of the AG.86 The AG was a vocal proponent of the bill, and
AAM was concerned that the loose terminology gives the AG wide latitude
for enforcement. 87 The AG acknowledged AAM’s concerns but stated that his
office “can only focus on the most egregious cases because of how the bill is
written and limited resources.”88 This lack of clarity and direction of the AG’s
enforcement created an issue concerning the potential monetary penalties
associated with a violation of the law.89 Accordingly, AAM argued HB631
failed to provide off-patent and generic drug companies “reasonable notice”
of prohibited conduct and failed to establish “minimum guidelines to govern
official’s exercise of discretion in implementing and enforcing it.90”
AAM’s arguments hold some merit given case law on the commerce clause
issue. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated a New
York law that regulated an out-of-state transaction triggered by a sale
occurring within the state.91 The act prohibited the sale of milk purchased
outside of the state of New York unless the price paid to the out of state
producers was similar to that of a transaction with an in-state producer.92 This
law was passed in an effort to incentivize New York milk dealers to buy from
in-state producers and was only triggered once the milk was actually sold in
the state.93 In this case, the plaintiff was a New York milk dealer who

84

Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11; § 2-802(a); § 2-8021(f).
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 11.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Families USA, Prescription Drug Price Gouging: Maryland’s Landmark Law
Protects
Consumers
(May
30,
2017).
http://familiesusa.org/blog/2017/05/prescription-drug-price-gouging-marylandlandmark-law-protects-consumers.
89
Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 12, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, (D. Md. Sept. 29,
2017) (No. MJG-17-1860), 2017 WL 4347818.
90
Id.
91
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 511.
92
Id. at 519.
93
Id.
85
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purchased milk from a Vermont creamery, who got their milk from producers
on Vermont farms.94 The Supreme Court determined the law violated the
established commerce clause doctrine by effectively regulating the out of state
price of milk sold in New York.95 The Court found that New York was
essentially using an in-state hook, (i.e. sale of the milk in New York) to affect
out of state conduct and pricing.96
The New York act at issue in Baldwin has one major difference compared
to Maryland’s law. In Baldwin, violation of the act was triggered by an actual
sale within the state of New York, otherwise known as an “as applied
challenge.”97 In contrast, Maryland’s law is only effective if the drug is
available for sale in Maryland but does not require an actual sale of the drug
to trigger relief.98 In other words, the Maryland law is being challenged on its
face as unconstitutional. Though the act at issue in Baldwin was ultimately
unsuccessful, the analysis would be inapplicable to Maryland’s new law.
B.

Current Litigation

In September of 2017, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland heard arguments in the case Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh to
address AAM’s constitutional challenges to HB 631.99 Specifically, the court
examined whether or not the new law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment vagueness standard.
The court used a two-tiered analysis to determine whether a state statute
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.100 The first tier dictates that a state
statute is usually struck down “without further inquiry” when it directly
regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or favors in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests.101 When a statute “regulates
even handedly”, the court moves to the second tier analysis, looking to
“whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate
commerce clearly exceeds local benefits.”102 Additionally, recent Supreme
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Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 519.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
§ 2-801.
99
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017).
100
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579,
106 S. Ct. 2080, 90 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1986); Star Scientific Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339,
355 (4th Cir. 2002).
101
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
102
Id.
95
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Court precedent has created a “third strand” of analysis, referred to as the
“extraterritoriality principle”.103 This analysis is specifically applied to price
control laws that control conduct outside of states borders.104
The United States District Court for Maryland held that AAM did not allege
a plausible Dormant Commerce Clause violation under the first tier or the
“extraterritoriality principle.”105 AAM argued that HB 631 impermissibly
regulates conduct occurring wholly outside of Maryland by controlling pricing
of manufacturers and wholesalers who do not sell directly to actors in
Maryland.106 According to the court, HB 631 limited its regulation to drug
manufacturers or wholesalers selling off-patent or generic drugs “made
available for sale in the State.”107 Therefore, the law did not reach those
manufactures or wholesalers whose drug will not, at some point, become
available for sale in Maryland.108 Though HB 631 could affect prices charged
by out-of-state distributors, the effect would only be applied to prices on drugs
sold within Maryland.109 The court further held that since HB 631 does not tie
the price charged in the sales of in-state drugs with the price charged on drugs
sold out-of-state, it does not have the “practical effect” of regulating commerce
occurring wholly outside of the state.
As for the second tier balancing test, the court also held that AAM failed to
allege a plausible claim.110 Under this test, if the statute regulates evenly to
create a legitimate local public interest, and it has only incidental effects on
interstate commerce, it will be upheld “unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the presumed local benefits.”111
Defenders stated their legitimate interest in enforcing HB 631 was to prevent
price-gouging in Maryland for essential medicines and to protect the health
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Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 8.
104
Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. V. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 595, 193 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2015).
105
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 20.
106
Id. at 13.
107
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-801 (b)(1) (LexisNexis 2017).
108
Id.
109
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 14.
110
Id. at 21.
111
Id. at 20; See generally Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401
F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2005).
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and safety of Maryland residents.112 AAM presented no arguments to refute
the validity of this legitimate interest. Ultimately, the court held that given the
state’s strong interest in protecting its residents, and since AAM had presented
no evidence to show that “the burden on interstate commerce would clearly
exceed the local benefits”, the challenge cannot succeed under this test.113 In
a later entry of final judgment, the court dismissed all claims relating to the
Dormant Commerce Clause.114
The Supreme Court has struck down statutes similar to HB 631 under the
first tier of analysis and the extra territoriality principle.115 In Brown-Forman,
the Court invalidated a provision of a New York law requiring liquor distillers
selling within the state to affirm that their prices for products sold in state were
not higher than the lowest price that the same product was sold for in any other
state during that month.116 Forcing a merchant to seek approval in one state
before transacting in another directly regulates interstate commerce.117 In this
case, once a distiller’s posted price takes effect in New York, the New York
State Liquor Authority must approve the price before it may lower its price for
the same item in other States.118 Though the statute did limit itself only to the
sale of liquor in New York, the court found it had the “practical effect” of
controlling the price of liquor in other states.119
In Healy, the Court invalidated the Connecticut Liquor Control Act under
the Commerce Clause.120 Much like in Brown-Forman, the act required out
of state beer shippers to affirm that the prices of their products sold to
Connecticut wholesalers weren’t higher than the prices of the same products
sold in bordering states.121 The Court reasoned that since the law forces out
of state beer shippers to seek approval for their prices before selling in another
state, the law was in direct violation of the Commerce Clause.122
More analogously, the structure of HB 631 is similar to the Virginia statute
at issue in Star Scientific Inc.123 That statute required cigarette manufacturers

112
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 7.
113
Id.
114
See generally Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL
4347818 (D. Md. 2017).
115
See Brown-Forman, 476 U.S.; Healy, 491 U.S.
116
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S.at 575.
117
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion).
118
Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583.
119
Id.
120
Healy, 491 U.S. at 342.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 6.
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to sign a Master Settlement Agreement.124 Non-participating parties had to
make an escrow payment on each cigarette sold “within the Commonwealth
whether directly or indirectly through a distributor . . .”125 The Fourth Circuit
distinguished the case from other similar price parity decisions in Healy and
Brown-Forman because the statute limited its applicability to only the sale of
cigarettes “within the Commonwealth.”126 According to the Fourth Circuit,
the statute did not directly link the prices of cigarettes sold in the state with
those sold outside of the state.127 Consequently, the statute did not have the
“practical effect” of controlling prices or transactions that occur completely
outside of the Virginia.128
Next, the United States District Court for Maryland addressed the Due
Process vagueness challenge. Persuasive precedent in Maryland suggests that
a law will not be void for vagueness if it “(1) establishes ‘minimal guidelines
to govern law enforcement,’ and (2) gives reasonable notice of the proscribed
conduct.”129 There is no clear standard to apply to facial vagueness
challenges.130 “At the very least, it appears that a facial challenge cannot
succeed if a ‘statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.’”131 A statute having a
“plainly legitimate sweep” must have “more than a conceivable
application.”132
AAM argued that the statute did not define the terms “excessive”, “not
justified” and “appropriate”, in relation to rising prices, requiring further
explanation to sufficiently understand the terms.133 The court ruled that in
cases of broad terms, each phrase is context specific, and must be examined
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Star Scientific Inc., 278 F.3d at 354.
Id.
126
Id. at 356.
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Id.
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Id.
129
Schleifer by Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 853 (quoting Elliot v. Administrator Animal &
Plant Health Inspection Serv., 990 F.2d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1993)).
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Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 8.
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U.S. v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513,518 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008)).
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Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. v. Comstock,
627 F.3d 513,518 (4th Cir. 2010)).
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Pl.’s Opp. Mot. Dismiss, Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860,
2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 2017) at 12.
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individually.134 Here, the court found that it is “at least very plausible” that
the combination of these broad terms could render the statute vague.135
AAM further argued that the term “meaningful” is unconstitutionally
vague.136 The entire phrase, “no meaningful choice”, is qualified by two sub
provisions: “(i) The importance of the drug to their health; and (ii) insufficient
competition in the market for the drug.”137 However, AAM did not challenge
either of these sub provisions as vague. Ultimately, the court concluded that
neither party provided an adequate record to resolve the vagueness issue.138
The court held that AAM’s claim for vagueness was “at least plausible” and
denied defendants motion seeking dismissal of the vagueness claims.
The unclear nature of the void for vagueness question caused the United
States District Court for Maryland to fall short of a definitive answer with
regards to HB 631.139 The Supreme Court has held, as a general principle, that
economic regulations receive a less strict vagueness test “because its subject
matter is often more narrow,” and because businesses are expected to consult
relevant legislation in advance of any action.140 Maryland’s act should
certainly fall within this category of economic regulations receiving a less
strict vagueness test.
Many statutes often use broad terms, and courts have upheld some of these
statutes against challenges for vagueness.141 While the Supreme Court and
Maryland have little precedent on the term “unconscionable” in regards to
vagueness challenges, other jurisdictions have taken up a vagueness challenge
using the term in some form.142 In Massachusetts, the court upheld a
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Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 11; See also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)(“A complaint must allege sufficient
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Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 9.
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2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md. 2017) at 27-28.
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MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 2-801 (f) (2) (LexisNexis 2017).
138
Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at 11.
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Id. at 11.
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Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498, S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.
Ed. 2d 362 (1982).
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See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (upholding an
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Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Mass. 1998) (rejecting a
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See generally United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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vagueness challenge using the term unconscionable.143 In that case, a law
established that a mortgage lender procuring a loan with rates or terms that
significantly deviate from industry wide standards that are otherwise
unconscionable would be guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices.144
However, the term “otherwise unconscionable” was never defined in the
law.145 This is in stark contrast to Maryland’s law, which at the very lease
attempts to further define the term “unconscionable increase”. 146
AAM appealed the District Court of Maryland’s dismissal of the Dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to the statute, as well as their refusal to enjoin
enforcement of the statutes for vagueness, to the United States Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.147 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the lower courts dismissal
de novo, accepting all well pleaded allegations of AAM as true, and “drawing
all reasonable inferences” in favor of AAM.148 Arguments in the case took
place on January 24, 2018, with the final decision being handed down on April
13, 2018.149
Maryland first argued that the extraterritoriality principal put forth by the
Supreme Court in Walsh was limited to price affirmation statutes.150 The
Court disagreed with this finding on the basis that Maryland’s interpretation
of the language in that case was too narrow.151 Justices Agee and Thacker also
rejected this notion, conversely holding that the Court’s statement on the
principal of extraterritoriality is violated if the law at issue “regulates the price
of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its inevitable
effect.”152 In Walsh, the Maine law at issue created a program where the state
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United Companies Lending Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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145
Id. at 206 (quoting Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E. 2d 1370, 1376 (Mass.
1980).
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Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL 4347818 (D. Md.
2017) at *9-10.
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See generally Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018).
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Id. at 667; See also Schilling v. Schmidt Baking Co., 876 F.3d 569, 599 (4th Cir.
2017).
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See generally, Ass’n for Accessible Meds, 887 F.3d (4th Cir. 2018).
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Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 669; See generally Pharmaceutical Research
& Manufactures of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155, L.Ed.2d
889 (2003)(holding that the rule applied in Baldwin and Healy did not apply to the
rebate program at issue because “unlike price control or price affirmation statutes,
‘[the program) does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its
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would “attempt to negotiate rebates with drug manufactures to fund the
reduced price for drugs offered to [program] participants.”153 To contrast, the
court explained that in Walsh, the Maine law directly affected only
transactions within Maine, and not the prices manufacturers could charge
outside of the state.154 Thus, the court found Maryland’s argument
unpersuasive, and held that the extraterritoriality principle applied not only to
price affirmation statutes, but also to any statute that regulates the price of any
out of state transaction.155
The Court next turned to the merits of AAM’s Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.156 AAM first asserted that the law is not triggered by any sale that
takes place solely within Maryland.157 The United States District Court for
Maryland found that the law passed the Dormant Commerce challenge
because the provisions of the law are only triggered where there is a drug made
available for sale in Maryland.158 However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with
this interpretation, finding that the plain language of the law allows Maryland
to enforce the law against parties in a transaction which may not have resulted
in any drugs being shipped to Maryland.159 The law defined “essential offpatent or generic drugs” as any drug “made available for sale in Maryland,”
and prohibited manufacturers from using the defense that they never sold
directly to any Maryland consumers. 160 The Court interpreted this language to
allow the law to apply to sales which take place outside of Maryland, or resale
transactions with non-Maryland consumers.161 In fact, Maryland admitted that
the law was intended to reach sales upstream from consumer sales occurring
in Maryland, meaning the law would potentially effect sales occurring outside
of Maryland.162 The Court thus found that the District Court erred in relying
on the “made available for sale” language when it upheld the law.163
AAM next contended that the law will impact transactions that occur
wholly outside of Maryland.164 Again, the Court agreed with AAM’s

153

Id. at 649.
Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 670.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See generally Ass’n for Accessible Meds v. Frosh, No. MJG-17-1860, 2017 WL
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interpretation, given that the law’s own terms measures the lawfulness of a
price increase by the price the manufacturer or wholesaler charges in the initial
sale of the drug.165 This allowed manufacturers and wholesalers to regulate
prices according to the initial sale of a drug, which may not have taken place
in Maryland. Since the law did not allow retailers to be held liable, only
manufacturers or wholesalers, the court found that the law specifically targeted
the upstream pricing and sale of prescription drugs, which both parties agreed
occurs mostly outside of Maryland.166
Maryland saw the upstream pricing impact of a state regulation as a
justification for the laws validity.167 However, the court disagreed citing a
similar statute in the Freedom Holdings case.168 In that case, a New York
statute banned the importation of cigarettes manufactured by companies that
did not comply with a state escrow law.169 The cigarette importers in this case
argued that the New York law regulated out-of-state commerce by required
manufacturers to sell higher priced cigarettes “to purchasers in sales
transactions that occur wholly outside New York.170 The Second Circuit
disagreed, finding that the effects raised by the importers constitutes no more
than incidental upstream pricing impact of a state regulation, and that “a
similar pricing impact might result for any state regulation of a product.”171 In
Freedom Holdings, the Court ultimately held that price change caused by the
New York law was the result of natural market forces, not artificially imposed
by a law in another state.172
In contrast, the Maryland law at issue attempted to impact prescription drug
manufactures reaction to market increases, and regulate the prices the
manufacturers charge for their drugs.173 This, the Court held, is “more than an
‘upstream pricing impact’ – it is a price control”, which is prohibited by the
Commerce Clause.174 The Fourth Circuit stated that Maryland can not, even
pursuant to protecting its consumers from skyrocketing drug prices, impose
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Ass’n for Acessible Meds, 87 F.3d at 671.
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price controls in this manner, finding that the district court erred by not
accounting for this impact.175
Finally, the court addressed the Act’s burden on interstate commerce in
prescription drugs.176 Since the Act targeted specifically wholesales, and not
retail pricing, the court found that a similar regulation imposed by another state
could require prescription drug manufacturers to abide by conflicting state
requirements.177 If different states enacted a similar law, a manufacturer may
initiate a transaction that is completely lawful in one state, yet be subject to
enforcement by another state completely unrelated to the transaction.178 If
Maryland requires manufacturers to sell drugs at a certain price, but another
state imposes a different price for the same drug, manufacturers could not
possibly comply with both laws simultaneously for the same transaction.179 If
a drug sold to another state later became available for sale in Maryland, the
Act permitted Maryland to penalize the manufacturer based on the price of the
drug sold to another state.180 The court found that these competing local
economic regulations is the exact scenario the Commerce Clause was meant
to preclude.181 As such, the Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of AAM, thus invalidating the Act.182
In a last ditch effort to save the law, Maryland filed a writ of certiorari to
the U.S. Supreme Court on October 19, 2018.183 They first alleged that the
Court’s extraterritoriality cases concern economic protectionism, not efforts
to protect consumers from predatory commercial practices.184 Maryland also
alleged that the price gouging ban is consistent with the Courts prior precedent
on the matter, and that due to the confusion among circuits over the scope of
the extraterritoriality principle, the Supreme Court should take the case.185
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Id. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336, 109 S.Ct. 2491 (“Generally speaking, the Commerce
Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state
regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State”); Brown-Foreman, 476 U.S.
at 583-84, 106 S.Ct. 2080.
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However, on February 19, 2019, the Supreme Court denied cert on the case,
thus ending Maryland’s long bid to uphold the law.186
,9

62/87,21

Over the years, several states have proposed solutions to the growing
concern of rising prescription drug prices including state rebate systems and
price caps on pharmaceutical drugs.187 While the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the state rebate system, the Federal Circuit halted D.C.’s attempt to regulate
pharmaceutical prices.188 On the federal level, Congress killed an attempt to
systematically import drugs from Canada in 2007; however, both the House
and the Senate introduced new legislation in February of 2017 to increase
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.189 Each proposal tackles the issue
of rising drug costs from a different angle and provides alternative methods to
Maryland’s failed approach.
A.

Maine and D.C. Approaches

Maine has employed one of the most successful programs to date to combat
rising drug prices.190 The program operates in conjunction with Medicaid, a
federal program offering financial assistance to states that reimburse medical
costs for individuals who otherwise could not afford care.191 Medicaid utilizes
a prior authorization program. In order “to reduce prescription drug prices for
residents of the State,” Maine utilized the prior authorization system with the
Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription Drugs (“Maine Rx
program”).192 The program includes both patients on Medicaid and those not,
limiting its availability to person with financial or medical need who don’t
“have a comparable or superior prescription drug benefit plan.”193
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The prior authorization program, established by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (“OBRA”) of 1990, authorized individual states to
negotiate rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers when purchased by a
Medicaid user.194 The rebates, paid by the pharmaceutical companies, directly
fund the reduced drug prices for Maine Rx participants.195 The drugs are only
covered under Medicaid if the manufacturer has agreed to give a rebate.196 If
a manufacturer decides to reject the rebate, their drugs will be placed on a prior
authorization list.197 Medicaid will only pay for drugs on the prior
authorization list if the physician proscribing the medicine gets authorization
from the Medicaid system.198 This provision is extremely undesirable to
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Being placed in this list and forcing physicians
to gain prior authorization could lead to doctors not proscribing that particular
drug.
Maine’s Rx program is not as expansive as it could be to protect consumers.
The law does not require manufacturers to join the program, which could lead
to inaccessibility of some important drugs to consumers in need.199
Additionally, the program does nothing for patients who do not qualify for the
“financial and medical need” category, but still cannot afford to pay for their
necessary drugs.200 Finally, even patients with insurance coverage experience
large bills for expensive medication, which results in higher costs for the
consumers.201
In 2005, D.C. took a different approach than Maine’s rebate system, but
was not as successful. The D.C. Excessive Pricing Act restricted the pricing
of excessively priced patented pharmaceuticals.202 This law differed from
Maryland’s law in that it attempted to regulate only patented drugs. The law
implemented a prohibition on drug manufacturers from selling patented
prescription drugs which resulted in the drug being sold for an excessive
price.203 While it was ground breaking at its time, the Federal Circuit Court of
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D.C. eventually struck down the law because federal patent laws preempted
the Act.204
The D.C. Excessive Pricing Act’s broad scope caused optimism among its
supporters.205 The act allowed a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
excessive pricing if the wholesale price of the patented drug in D.C. is over
thirty percent higher than the price for the same drug in any “high income
country“ where the product also has a patent.206 High-income countries
included the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, and Australia.207 However,
unlike Maryland’s law, excessive pricing was never explicitly defined in the
D.C. Excessive Pricing Act.208
B.

Recent Federal Attempts

The recent trend of rising drug prices has also caught the attention of federal
legislators. In 2017, two bills were introduced in both Houses aimed at
increasing competition in the pharmaceutical industry in an attempt to drive
down prices.209 Rather than outright prohibiting price hikes of pharmaceutical
drugs, the bills attack some of the root causes of price hikes. Examples of these
causes include long waits for the approval of an abbreviated new drug from
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) causing a scarcity of certain drugs
on the market, which in turn, drives prices up. These abbreviated drugs are
generic forms of other patented drugs on the market, which increase
competition.
The House’s Lower Drug Costs through Competition Act and the Senate’s
Increasing Competition in Pharmaceuticals Act are largely similar in
content.210 There is a significant backlog of abbreviated new drug applications
for generic drugs, which limits the options on the market.211 The bills outlines
a general premise that improving the review procedures of abbreviated new
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drugs would help improve competition and lower prices for patients, as well
as establishing a clear timeframe for the FDA to expedite the review of certain
applications when necessary.212
The bills edit Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by
adding the issuance of “Generic Priority Review Vouchers” for generic drugs
to accelerate the long approval process.213 The Secretary of Health and Human
Services is directed to review the vouchers no later than 150 calendar days
after the application has been submitted for review.214 Additionally, the
vouchers may be transferred between manufacturers, including by sale.215
This could, for example, allow a manufacturer to transfer their voucher to a
manufacturer of a different drug due to a shortage in supply of the drug on the
market. The voucher system frees many generic drugs from sluggish
bureaucracy, resulting in many more drugs hitting the market much faster than
in the past. Though the bills have gained bipartisan support across the country,
neither has passed its respective house.216
C.

Increased Need For Federal Legislation

Maryland tried and failed to implement a groundbreaking solution to
protect its citizens from the dangers of rising drug costs. Other states took
notice of Maryland’s attempt, and have attempted to following suit.
Maryland’s law was groundbreaking in its own right, but only further
complicated a greater federal regulatory scheme to bring down the prices of
pharmaceutical drugs.
The program employed in Maine simply does not require enough
accountability from manufacturers for Maryland to adopt a similar plan. For
instance, Maine’s Rx program does not require manufacturers to enter into
rebate agreements. By not entering the agreement, the drug is placed on a prior
authorization list, requiring the doctor to get approval from Medicaid. This,
theoretically, discourages doctors from prescribing that particular drug due to
the extra prior authorization step. However, while many of these
manufacturers are national, some are international companies which do
business all over the world. A decrease in orders for a specific drug in one
state, or even two is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on these large
companies.
As this issue gained greater national attention, it become more apparent that
overarching federal legislation on the issue of pharmaceutical drug pricing is
necessary to increase competition in the generic drug market specifically, and
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help drive prices down overall. President Donald Trump has proposed new
initiatives to help lower drug prices.217 Additionally, his 2016 Presidential
opponent, Hillary Clinton, outlined a plan to combat “Unjustified price hikes
for Long-Available Drugs.”218 In March of 2017, Rep. Elijah Cummings of
Maryland and Rep. Peter Welch of Vermont met with President Trump in the
White House to discuss this issue, however, nothing has materialized from the
conversation. These attempts illustrate the desire to find a solution on the
federal level.
In order to create uniformity among the states, the federal government must
tackle this issue head on. To date, we have seen a few examples of individual
states attempting to take on this legislation, which usually results in lengthy
litigation.219 If this troubling trend continues, we could be left with individual
states, and subsequently Federal Circuits, determining which programs work
and which ones don’t. The varying political opinions of the circuits could lead
to more regulation in certain places than in others, making it harder for
manufacturers to follow the different laws of each given state. State by State
solutions would only hinder the overall mission to decrease pharmaceutical
prices and allow access to more affordable drugs for all Americans.
D.

A Potential Solution for Maryland

In response to Maryland’s efforts, states around the country have attempted
to help curb rising prescription drug costs one way or another.220 Many have
looked to Maryland’s approach to facilitate their own lawmaking process.221
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However, with no current federal legislation in place, Maryland should take
steps to improve their failed law.
Maryland could benefit tremendously from amending the law to reduce
ambiguities with its enforcement. In California, the legislature recently passed
a drug transparency law attempting to combat the same problem as
Maryland.222 California’s law requires pharmaceutical companies to notify the
state and health insurers of a rise in price of their medication of 16 percent or
more over a two-year period.223 Additionally, companies will be required to
provide justification of the increase to California’s Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development.224 The law faced similar backlash to the law in
Maryland, with drug companies challenging the legislation almost
immediately, and is currently still pending litigation.225
Maryland could either try to pass new legislation or simply amend their
failed law in order to catch price rises before they affect Maryland consumers.
In regards to the first option, Maryland could follow California’s lead by
adopting a law that works in conjunction with a new version of their recently
failed law and requires companies to give notice when a raise in prices is
coming. Under the recently repealed law, Maryland’s AG made the
determination of whether or not a drugs price hike is unconscionable. This
determination would take time and force consumers to pay the raised price
until that determination is made. By passing a similar transparency law to
California, the AG would be notified before the price hike, and could make
the determination of whether or not the rise in price is unconscionable before
the law takes effect. This method could also save the State money by limiting
the number of law suits brought on behalf of Maryland residents against these
large manufacturing companies, most of whom likely have large capital to
expend on legal fees.
The MD Price Gouging Act was a start, but not the solution to the country’s
need to ultimately allow for federal legislation. In the 1970’s, pharmacies
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substitution of brand name drugs in favor of generic drugs was illegal in most
of the country.226 In response, Kentucky filed controversial law allowing the
practice or substitution patented drugs for generic drugs in their state.227
Similar laws began to be passed nationwide, and within eight years, generic
drug substitution became federal law.228 Similarly since the passage of
Maryland’s law, sixteen other states have passed laws either addressing price
gouging, or calling for better transparency from drug companies with regards
to their price hikes.229 With their recent attempt at a law combating this issue,
Maryland could have laid the groundwork for a similar path to federal
legislation.
9

&21&/86,21

The need for federal legislation on this issue has never been greater. In the
United States, nine out of every ten prescriptions filled are for a generic
drug.230 The limited availability of these drugs, which quite literally save lives
every day, should be a crime in its own right. Approaching the issue on a
state-by-state basis could prove to work in the long run, but could also only
further complicate compliance from many pharmaceutical companies due to
the varying laws by state. That is why federal legislation is needed to allow
increased, and in some instances expedited access to important generic drugs.
With more options available on the market, drug prices will be driven down to
the benefit of millions.
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